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Rethinking just war

A year since the World Trade Center bombing, most Americans should feel confident that they can describe what constitutes an unjust war. But as the US considers a second invasion of Iraq in a dozen years, civilian deaths during the recent operations in Afghanistan and moral ambiguities surrounding US military operations in Somalia and the Balkans should cause Americans to revisit just war thinking.

First formulated in the fifth century as the Roman Empire crumbled, just war theory has changed as the context of warfare has changed.

During the Cold War, just war theory’s principle of “probable success” contributed to the superpowers’ doctrine of mutually assured destruction. The odds of launching a successful nuclear strike were believed to be so slim as to deter such an attack from ever taking place.

But since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the horrible safety of mutually assured destruction seems quaint and ineffectual. New technologies–biological weapons and so-called “smart weapons”–and new practices–global terrorism and the mass media’s panoptic presence–are radically changing the context for assessing what makes any armed conflict just or unjust.

Germs, germs everywhere
Despite the recent media frenzy about “dirty bombs,” a more pressing danger persists in germ warfare. During the Cold War, the two superpowers both engaged in secretive bioterror research–even after they had both signed treaties avowing germ warfare deployment or development.* Germ weapons are just as lethal as nuclear weapons, but less predictable and far less expensive to develop. Easily hidden and easily deployed, bioweapons cannot be tracked as easily as the Cold War’s ICBMs, making them more inviting for second-string powers to use. The principle of probable success is less restraining if a nation believes it can launch a devastating strike before its enemies would be able to retaliate in kind. A gross violation of the principle of “discrimination,” germ warfare can deliver holocaust cheaply and effectively. Deterring an imminent bioterror attack remains difficult if not impossible, even if such deterrence would be allowed by the principle of “just cause.” Yet possession of bioweapons does not necessarily imply an impending attack, as shown by the US’ and Russia’s unused germ warfare stockpiles.

How smart is a smart bomb?
If nuclear and biological weapons grossly violate the principle of discrimination, newly developed “smart weapons” seem tailor designed around the principle and may even render weapons of mass destruction unnecessary. Hailed during the Gulf War, precision-guided munitions still seem to hold more promise than punch.

But development continues at a rapid pace, and smart bombs grow smarter every year. Not only is accuracy increasing, but the scramjet technology used in cruise missiles also continues to advance, giving smart missiles greater range and speed. New launching devices currently in development could make it possible to launch a precision-guided missile from the US that would hit a specific target in China in less than an hour. At velocities six times the speed of sound, precision munitions would be quite formidable.†

In contrast to the saturation bombing that characterized twentieth century warfare, fully realized smart weapons would make noncombatant casualties not only unnecessary militarily but also incredibly unlikely. (Assuming intelligence is accurate, as shown in the US’ destruction of China’s embassy in Serbia.) Aircraft carriers and tanks–also staples of twentieth century war–would rapidly fade into obsolescence, being so many sitting ducks to laser-guided, hypersonic smart weapons. The promised high success rate of smart weapons could make armed conflict short-lived and intense: wars of attrition are unnecessary when military force can accurately disable an enemy in a single blow. But with the promise of such success, would armed conflict become much more frequent?

Star wars, a second episode
The same technologies that promise to launch hypersonic smart weapons will also be able to launch items into orbital space. The cost to develop this “rail launching” technology is exorbitant, but the savings in launch costs could be considerable. While it costs $9100 a pound to launch the Space Shuttle, items launched from a future Super High Altitude Research Project gun could launch at a cost of around $225 a pound.† (The extreme inertia of such a launch would make it impossible to use a SHARP gun to launch people into orbit, but that limitation would make it no less destructive or useful.)

While it would seem that the vastness of space would open up endless new “real estate” for “weaponization,” the gravity effects of the earth and moon actually limit where orbiting weapons could be deployed. Already, world communications satellites are heavily concentrated in two orbital “tracks” that would make easy targets for smart weapons. Atmospheric exit points from known launch sites could be handily guarded. And there are five points in space where the balance of gravity between the earth and moon is such that space stations (armed or unarmed) could sit there indefinitely without having to adjust their orbits.† If space is indeed “weaponized” as the Bush administration has hinted, the struggle for prime orbital real estate could be rather intense.

Since current international treaties prohibit the arming of space, it will be difficult for nations to argue that they have a territorial right to space, or a territorial right to defend space. But the military control that arming space might offer–coupled with smart weapons–could lead some nations into space warfare in spite of just war theory.

Knights and stormtroopers even?
Advances in composite materials continue; bulletproof Kevlar vests are only the beginning. The Pentagon is currently exploring the development of body armor technologies that bear an uncanny resemblance to Darth Vader’s stormtroopers. If smart weapons might render goliath tanks and aircraft carriers obsolete, “smart infantry” might fill in the gap. Hard to track, these postmodern knights would carry arsenals of small smart weapons to rival even the Caped Crusader at his best. The small hummingbird spy planes hailed in post-September 11 media coverage could provide local reconnaissance. Networked, decentralized computer technology would make battlefield reporting and coordination accurate and difficult to disrupt.

The money and effort to train and equip these twenty-first century stormtroopers would be prohibitive, and if they are effective as their proponents suggest, few will be needed anyway. Conscription as we have known it would be unnecessary and unproductive; a battalion of today’s infantry would be cannon fodder against “smart infantry.” Seen in this light, the analogy to medieval knights looks less fanciful. Would a doctrine of postmodern chivalry be developed to provide a moral compass for cyber-samurai? Will the expertise of these postmodern warriors lead to a decentralization of military control, perhaps an era dominated by neo-feudal mercenaries and their warlords?

Shoot but don’t kill
The Pentagon is also exploring the development of nonlethal weapons. Weapons like the “sick sticks” seen in Steven Spielberg’s Minority Report would lend themselves easily to police work. But what would a battle between armies equipped with nonlethal weapons look like?

For much of human history, communities at odds with each other had a method short of armed conflict at hand to resolve their differences. Seen in the parry, the joust, and even the high school football game, these usually nonlethal combats provide rehearsal for a later “real” battle and allow for the venting of frustrations by combatants and spectators alike. But if smart weapons are available, will communities choose nonlethal means or take the chance of the quicker and more final victory that precision weapons might allow?

Desperate times & desperate measures
It is easy and right to condemn terrorism. The indiscriminate violence of terrorism violates much of just war theory. Terrorism is not only indiscriminate but deliberately indiscriminate, targeting noncombatants at least as often as armed soldiers. The organizations that practice terrorism are not “proper authorities,” understood for some time to mean only duly recognized nation-states. And thus far, history shows that terrorism has little chance of success.

So how do terrorists justify their actions? Clearly, they believe their actions meet the standard of last resort, allowing them to violate the principles of discrimination and proportionality. In a bizarre twist of the concept of “total war,” they believe killing civilians a military necessity, exempting them from proportionality and discrimination. They seem to believe their cause is so desperate and so right that any means are justifiable and–in a fit of magic thinking–that the next successful attack will bring them victory. They believe that it is their opponents’ ascendance–and not their disavowal of peaceful political methods–that prevents them from fulfilling the principle of proper authority.

Even the development of foolproof smart weapons will not provide a solution to our terrorist problem. And there is little guarantee that the destruction (or even containment) of current terrorist organizations would end the threat. In fact, retaliation could breed even more terrorism. Classically, a nation must meet all the principles of just war theory to consider any armed conflict justified. Is the US prepared to conduct the war on terrorism in light of the whole of just war theory? Or will it follow the terrorists’ lead and pick and choose only those just war principles it finds convenient?

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* Judith Miller, et al, Germs: Biological Weapons and America’s Secret War. Simon & Schuster, 2001.
† George & Meredith Friedman, The Future of War: Power, Technology and American World Dominance in the Twenty-First Century. St. Martin’s Griffin, 1996.

Classic Just War Theory
Classically understood, for a war to be just, it must must meet all of the following criteria:

(1) Just cause. An actual or imminent violation of state’s rights. Can also include protecting human rights.

(2) Proper authority. Recognized states are the only organizations authorized to use force under just war theory.

(3) Right intention. The aim of a just war is speedy resolution without undue suffering or destruction.

(4) Proportionality. The destruction of war must not outweigh its anticipated benefits.

(5) Last resort. All diplomatic means must be exhausted before conflict can begin.

(6) Probability of success.

(7) Discrimination. Harming noncombatants is prohibited.

Souce: The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Edited by Robert Audi. Cambridge University Press, 1995.

[ Posted by Chance Hunter at September 1, 2002 11:25 AM | More Opinion articles ]

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